全美最大銀行之一, JP Morgan的CEO, Jamie Dimon的股東信是想要了解金融和投資的人必讀的文章. 他在四月八號剛寫了一份, 篇長38頁的股東信, 我擷取一些段落在下面:
On Rationality: Our long-term view means that we do not manage to temporary P/E ratios — the tail should not wag the dog
- Price/earnings (P/E) ratios, like stock prices, are temporary and volatile and should not be used to run and build a business. We have built one great franchise, our way, which has been quite successful for some time. As long as the business being built is a real franchise and can stand the test of time, one should not overreact to Mr. Market. This does not mean we should not listen to what investors are saying – it just means we should not overreact to their comments – particularly if their views reflect temporary factors. I often have received bad advice about what we should do to earn a higher P/E ratio
- Before the crisis, I was told that we were too conservatively financed and that more leverage would help our earnings. Outsiders said that one of our weaknesses in fixed income trading was that we didn’t do enough collateralized debt obligations and structured investment vehicles. And others said that we couldn’t afford to invest in initiatives like our own branded credit cards and the buildout of our Chase Private Client franchise during the crisis.
- "Examples like these are exactly the reasons why one should not follow the herd."
On Management: Think like a long-term investor, manage like an operator
- So our ultimate goal is to think like a longterm investor – build great franchises, strengthen moats and have good throughthe-cycle financial results. Achieve the benefits of scale and eliminate the negatives. Develop great long-term achievable strategies. And manage the business relentlessly, like a great operator. Finally, continue to develop excellent management that keeps it all going. As Thomas Edison said, “Vision without execution is hallucination.
On Economy: Some things never change — there will be another crisis, and its impact will be felt by the financial markets
- The trigger to the next crisis will not be the same as the trigger to the last one – but there will be another crisis. Triggering events could be geopolitical (the 1973 Middle East crisis), a recession where the Fed rapidly increases interest rates (the 1980-1982 recession), a commodities price collapse (oil in the late 1980s), the commercial real estate crisis (in the early 1990s), the Asian crisis (in 1997), so-called “bubbles” (the 2000 Internet bubble
and the 2008 mortgage/housing bubble), etc. While the past crises had different roots (you could spend a lot of time arguing the degree to which geopolitical, economic or
purely financial factors caused each crisis), they generally had a strong effect across the financial markets.
- While crises look different, the anatomy of how they play out does have common threads. When a crisis starts, investors try to protect themselves. First, they sell the assets they believe are at the root of the problem. Second, they generally look to put more of their money in safe havens, commonly selling riskier assets like credit and equities and buying safer assets by putting deposits in strong banks, buying Treasuries or purchasing very safe money market funds. Often at one point in a crisis, investors can sell only less risky assets if they need to raise cash because, virtually, there may be no market for the riskier ones. These investors include individuals, corporations, mutual funds, pension plans, hedge funds – pretty much everyone – each individually doing the right thing for themselves but, collectively, creating the market disruption that we’ve witnessed before. This is the “run-on-the-market” phenomenon that you saw in the last crisis.
想讀整篇文章的人，可以到JP Morgan投資人關係找，或點這連結 (PDF)．